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Dicey calls attention to the fact that there are two great schools of
writers on the Conflict of Laws-the theoretical and the positive. The
theoretical writers attempt to deduce the rules of the Conflict of Laws
from some a priori principle. Starting with some general principle,
they try to derive therefrom a body of consistent rules. The positive
method, on the other hand, studies the actual rules in force and attempts
to reduce them to systematic order. The theoretical method is adopted
by the great majority of continental writers, whereas the positive method
is preEminently that of the English and American writers. Concerning
the advantages and disadvantages of the theoretical method Dicey
says:'
"The advantages of the theoretical mode of treatment, when employed
by a man of genius, such as" Savigny, are in danger of being underrated
by English lawyers, to whose whole conception of law it is at bottom
opposed. It is therefore a duty to bring these merits into prominence.
The two great merits of the method are, first, that it keeps before the
minds of students the agreement between the different countries of
Europe as to the principles to be adopted for the choice of law, and next
that it directs notice to the consideration which English lawyers are
apt to forget; that the choice of one system of law rather than of
another for the decision of a particular case is dictated by reasons of
logic, of convenience, or of justice, and is not a matter in any way of
mere fancy or precedent. Whether, for example, the legal effect of a
given transaction ought to be tested by the lex actus, the lex domicilii, or
the lex fori, is a matter admitting of discussion, and which ought to be
discussed on intelligible grounds of principle...
"The true charge against the theoretical method is that it leads the
writers who adopt it to treat as being law what they think ought to be
law, and to lay down for the guidance of the courts of every country
rules which are not recognized as law in any country whatever. 'The
- jurists of continental Europe,' writes Story, 'have, with uncommon skill
and acuteness, endeavored to collect principles whiclh ought to regulate
this subject among all nations. But it is Very questionable whether
their success has been at all proportionate to their labour, and whether
their principles, if universally adopted, would be found either convenient
or desirable, or even just, under all circumstances.' This remark exactly
hits the weak point of a method which rests on the assumption, common
to most German jurists, but hardly to be admitted by an English lawyer,
that there exist certain self-evident principles of right whence can be
deduced a system of legal rules, the rightness of which will necessarily
approve itself to all competent judges."
Anglo-American writers, being positivists, attempt to state only the
rules laid down by the English and American courts and they do not
claim universal validity for these rules. English writers in particular
'Dicey, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1922) 18-ig.
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have been careful not to indulge in any generalizations not warranted
by the decisions. There are certain statements in Story, on the other
hand, which might suggest that the Anglo-American rules of the
Conflict of Laws have been established as the direct result of the
principle of the territoriality of law.
Says Story:
"Before entering upon any examination of the various heads, which
a treatise upon the Conflict of Laws will naturally embrace, it seems
necessary to advert to a few general maxims or axioms which constitute
the basis upon which all reasonings on the subject must necessarily rest;
and without the express or tacit admission of which it will be found
impossible to arrive at any principles to govern the conduct of nations,
or to regulate the due administration of justice." 2
"The first and most important general maxim or proposition is that
which has been already adverted to, that every nation possesses an
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. The
direct consequence of this rule is, that the laws of every state affect
and bind directly all property, whether real or personal, within its
territory, and all persons who are resident within it, whether natural-
born subjects or aliens, and also all contracts made and acts done
w ithin it." 
' '
"Another maxim or proposition is, that no state or nation can by its
laws directly affect or bind property out of its own territory, or bind-
persons not resident therein, whether they are natural-born subjects or
others. This is a natural consequence of the first proposition; for it
would be wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of the
sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation should be at liberty to
regulate either persons or things not within its territory."4
"Upon this rule there is often ingrafted an exception of some impor-
tance to be rightfully understood. It is that although the laws of a
nation have no direct binding force or effect, except upon persons within
its own territories, yet that every nation has a right to bind its own
subjects by its own laws in every other place."5
Compared with the continental systems, it is manifest that the Anglo-
American rules of the Conflict of Laws give a much wider range to the
application of the law of the situs as regards transactions affecting real
property.6 The powers of executors and administrators, guardians and
trustees in bankruptcy, according to Anglo-American law, do not extend
on principle beyond the limits of the state in which they were appointed,
whereas the contrary is true on the continent.7 The jurisdiction of
courts in personal causes of action is predicated upon service of process
within the state.8 In these and other respects the Anglo-American




'Concerning the continental law see Lorenzen, Cwses on the Conflict of Laws
(2d ed. 1924) 5o6, note; P7, note.
'Lorenzen, op. cit. 9o3, note.
'The continental and South American countries take a contrary view. Lorenzen,
op. ci. 126-127, note.
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system of the Conflict of Laws may be characterized as more territorial
in its nature than the continental. So far as Story's maxims express
only this general attitude of the Anglo-American law no fault can be
found with them. They cannot be approved, however, in so far as they
suggest that the rules of the Conflict of Laws adopted by the English
and American courts follow as a matter of logical and necessary deduc-
tion from the principle of the territoriality of law.
Directing the attention to the particular form in which the maxims
are expressed by Story and the immediate consequences drawn there-
from, one cannot help but be impressed by the vagueness of their
character. What does Story mean when he says that as a direct conse-
quence of the exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction which a state
possesses within its own territory its laws affect and bind directly all
property within its territory, persons resident therein, and acts done
therein?
As regards real estate Anglo-American courts have gone far in
applying the law of the situs. Conveyances of land are accordingly
held to be governed by that law, both as to "capacity, .... form," and
"essential validity." This rule had been applied not only by the courts
of the state in which the land is situated (state A), but also by the
courts of any other state in which the common law point of view
exists. That the above rule is not a necessary one, resulting directly
from the "exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction" of state A is seen,
however, from the fact that since the time Story wrote a good many
legislatures have enacted that deeds to land within their state shall be
deemed sufficiently executed if they satisfy the form requirements of the
place of execution.9 This shows that state A can determine legal rela-
tions with reference to land lying with its territory by some other rule
than the lex rei sitae. On the continent the law of the situs is not
applied with reference to either "capacity" or "form."'1
State A has, of course, no power to impose its own policy upon any
other sovereign state. Only some supra-state authority could do this.
In its application to chattels, Story's first maxim does not give in
the least an accurate picture of the rules of the Conflict of Laws prevail-
ing at the time or now. The transfer of chattels was governed at the
time Story wrote by the law of the situs neither as regards "capacity."
"formalities," or "essential validity." Rights therein were governed
as a rule by the law of the domicile of the owner. During the latter
half of the last century a more controlling influence has been given by
Anglo-American law to the law of the situs with respect to chattels than
'See Lorenzen, The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in
the Conflict of Laws (19I1) 20 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 427, 433-434" See also It re
De Nicols [igoo] 2 Ch. Div. 410, where it is suggested that the law of matri-
monial domicile may control the rights of husband and wife in English realty if
the parties were domiciled at the time of their marriage in a state in which the
community of property rigime prevailed. Compare Dicey, op. cit. 555.
"Supra note 6.
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theretofore, but only where the transfer was inter vivos, and did not
result from the operation of law.11 The sovereign of the situs has
declined also, on grounds of policy, to apply its local law in instances
which cannot be explained on any theory of territoriality.'
2 To say that
the law of the situs has "exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction" with
respect to chattels is, therefore, only a vague and meaningless statement,
which does not express the existing law on this subject.
Story next asserts that state A has "exclusive sovereignty and-juris-
diction" over all persons who are resident within it. It is difficult to
see how this is the direct consequence of the "exclusive sovereignty
and jurisdiction" which state A possesses within its territory. One
would expect from such exclusive territorial jurisdiction that state A
would have power with respect to all persons physically within the
state, and this is the actual law of England and the United States as
regards the jurisdiction of courts in personal causes of action, service
of process within state A on any person found within the state having
always been deemed sufficient by Anglo-American courts.' 3 When
Story made the above statement he evidently had in mind what is often
spoken of as "status." But why should the law of the residence or
domicile of a person govern in this respect rather than some other
law? No theory based upon the territoriality of law can give an answer
to this question, for to say that domiciled persons are constructively
withina the territory is to make use of a fiction which confuses "terri-
torial" and "personal" jurisdiction. Since the time Story wrote many
of the continental countries, as well as Brazil, Japan, etc., have accepted
the law of nationality in this regard.14 Whether the law of domicile,
the law of nationality or some other law is adopted for the solution of
the problems of the Conflict of Laws involving "status," depends again
upon the policy of state A and cannot be derived from any theory of
territoriality.
Another direct consequence of his first maxim, according to Story,
is that the laws of every state affect and bind directly all contracts made
and acts done within the state. This statement can be true only so far
as the courts of state A are concerned, for state A has no power to
"See Cammell v. Sewell (i86o, Exch. CIL) 5 Hurl. & N. 728. Where the
passing of "title!' results directly from the operation of law, the lex donicilii is
generally held to control. De Nicols v. Curlier [19oo, H. L.] A. C. 21 (matri-
monial property) ; Saul v. His Creditors (1827, La.) 5 Mart. (N. s.) 569 (matri-
monial property); Ennis v. Smith (1852, U. S.) 14 How. 4oo (intestate
succession).
'See .Wray Bros. v. White Auto Co. (1922) 155 Ark. 153, 244 S. W. 18
(registration of chattel mortgage).
"Pennoyer v. Neff (877) 95 U. S. 714; Fisher v. Fielding (1895) 67 Conn.
9r, 34 At. 714. The continental law is opposed to this view. See Lorenzen,
op. cit. supra note 6, at pp. 126-127, note.
" Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 9, note; Art. 3 of Japanese Law Con-
cerning the Application of Lauts in General, De Becker, International Private Law
of Tapan (1919) 75.
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prescribe the Conflict of Laws rules for any other state. The applica-
tion of its own local rules to contracts made within the state or wrongful
acts done within its territory does not result, however, of necessity
from the territoriality of law, but from the policy of state A.'5  Story
himself maintains that state A should apply the law of state B to a
contract made in state A and to be performed in state B.16
Story's second maxim, which is said to be a corollary of the first, is
that no state can by its laws directly affect or bind property out of its
own territory or bind persons not resident therein. This maxim is even
more misleading than the first. So far as B's courts are concerned, or
the courts of another state, state A can of course not bind them in any
way. It can lay down rules in the Conflict of Laws only for its own
courts. But if A is a sovereign state, can it not provide that upon the
death of the owner his property, including real estate in state B, shall
pass to his heirs in accordance with the personal law of the deceased?
Such a provision may be, of course, impolitic if the rule of the situs is
not identical, but the question to be considered is merely whether state
B has exclusive jurisdiction in the sense that no other state can deter-
mine jural relations with respect to real property situated in state B in
accordance with some local law other than that of the situs. It would
seem manifest that, unless forbidden by some supra-state authority, a
sovereign state, A, has the power, so far as its own courts are concerned,
to determine all jural relations including those affecting real property
in state B as its own sense of justice and policy may suggest.'7 Indeed,
the Italian Civil Code has a specific provision that all property, including
real estate in foreign countries, shall devolve in case of death in accor-
dance with the law of the state or country to which the deceased belonged
by nationality.' It is true, of course, that if the land were situated in
this country the Italian provision would have no effect so far as our
courts are concerned, but if the matter comes before an Italian court, the
rights of the heirs would be determined as if the property were Italian
property.
No state has so far attempted to say that the "title" to foreign realty
shall be determined under all circumstances, so far as its courts are
concerned, by a rule other than that of the situs. The Italian courts
have had sufficient difficulty with their limited rule, as regards succession
" Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 01924) 33 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 457, 466 ff.
"Story, op. cit. supra note q, at p. 376.
" See Cook, op. cit. supra note 15, at p. 457; (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 67;
Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 2o
CoL. L. REv. 247, 265, 270 ff.
"Art. 8 of the Preliminary Dispositions of the Italian Civil Code expressly
provides that the national law of the decedent shall govern testamentary and
intestate succession, including movables and immovables wherever situated. See
also Cass. Turin, Dec. 20, 1905 (35 Clunet, 19io); but compare Cass. Palermo,
Aug. 25, 1894 (Sirey, 1895, 4, 28, note).
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upon death, to be a warning to other countries. The fact that the
physical res is in state B gives to state B in the nature of things the
exclusive power to control the physical possession and enjoyment of the
real property within its territory. State A has no such control and
can acquire it only by making war upon B and gaining control over the
physical res. State A can create a local "title" to land in state B, but
it would be a "title" which might not be recognized by state B and
without such recognition it would be worth little. Full ownership in
land implies the possibility of the actual enjoyment of the physical res.
On grounds of obvious expediency and common sense, it is held, there-
fore, practically universally that the "title" to land shall be determined
in case of conflict with reference to the law of the situe. No such
compelling grounds of convenience exist, however, so far as the law
of the situs gives effect to a foreign rule contrary to its own local rule.
On this principle courts of equity in England and the United States have
declared rights with respect to foreign land in accordance with their
own local rules and without reference to the rule of the situs.19 In these
cases it is said that the "title" to the foreign law is affected only
"indirectly," by virtue of the power of the court to compel the parties
before them to execute the proper papers. In view, however, of the
fact that the duty upon which the action of the court is predicated does
not exist under the law of the situs, but is created by the law of the
state where the action is brought, it is obvious that the law of the
forum is allowed to change the legal relations with respect to foreign
land. There is no supra-state rule that all rights with respect to foreign
land must be determined under all circumstances in accordance with the
law of the situs, and until such a rule is established each sovereign state
must determine the matter in accordance with its own sense of what is
convenient and just.2 0  In this country complete freedom is not
possessed, of course, by the individual states because of constitutional
provisions.
So far as the second maxim relates to chattels it was inexact at the
time Story wrote even as a matter of self-limitation on the part of
state A. State A as an independent sovereign could, of course, deter-
mine, so far as A's courts are concerned, legal relations with respect to
chattels in state B, in accordance with some other law than that of state
B, and the courts actually determined such rights in accordance with
the law of the owner's domicile.21
With respect to persons, Story's second maxim would not allow
state A to bind "persons not resident therein," except citizens of state
" Cranstown v. Johnston (796, Ch.) 3 Ves. 17o; E. parte Pollard (184o,
Bankruptcy) Mont. & C. 239; Burnley v. Stevenson (1873) 24 Ohio St. 474.
" International law does not limit the power of states in this respect. See
Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, supra note 17, at
pp. 265, 278 if.
' The notion that the law of the sitUs should control was introduced only in
i866 through the case of Caminell v. Sewell, supra note ii.
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A. Why Story should regard the power of state A to bind persons
domiciled in state A wherever they are as a'consequence of the "exclu-
sive sovereignty and jurisdiction" of -state A within its territory, and
its power over citizens as an exception to the principle of territoriality,
it is difficult to see. So far as state A exercises jurisdiction over
persons actually within another state, either because they are domiciled
in state A, or because they are citizens of state A, it is clear that the
jurisdiction is assumed because of a personal relationship between
the party and state A. That state A may properly do so is generally,
but not universally, admitted.22 Both grounds of jurisdiction would
appear to be exceptions to Story's theory of territoriality.
-Although Story has omitted an express statement to that effect, it
would seem to follow as a natural consequence from his first maxim
that state A has no power to affect or bind contracts or other acts done
in another state. But such a statement as this could mean only that as a
matter of self-limitation state A would not exercise its power. If it saw
fit state A could say that, so far as its courts are concerned, the local
rule of state A should apply to all contracts wherever made and to all
torts wherever committed. In fact some territorialists have advocated
that the lex fori should always govern as regards foreign torts.28
Story's statement is not true even from the standpoint of self-limitation
on the part of state A. Story himself does not adhere to the view that
the law of the state where a contract was entered into governs its
validity, for he expressly holds that where the place of performance is
in another state, the law of the latter controls.24 And the English
Court of Appeal has awarded damages for a tort, according to the
rules of English law, although the wrongful act did not give rise to a
private action in the state where it was committed, but only to a criminal
prosecution.2 5  The weight of Anglo-American 26 as well as of conti-
nental27 authority is opposed also to the view that the law of the place
where a contract is made determines the validity of such contract. All
of this goes to show that the application of the law of the place of the
contract or act is not firmly nor uniformly established even in Anglo-
American law as a matter of self-limitation.
' In favor of such jurisdiction see'Douglas v. Forrest (1828, C. P.) 4 Bing. 686;
Henderson v. Staniford (187o) 1O5 Mass. 504; McDonald v. Mabee (1917) 243
U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343. Contra: De la Montanya v. De la Montanya (1896)
112 Calif. 1oI, 44 Pac. 345; Raher v. Raher (1911) 150 Iowa, 5,1, 129 N. W.
494.
'Wchter, Uber die Kollision der Privatrechtsgesetze versschiedener Staaten
(1842) 25 ARcHIv FORl DiE ciV1ISTISCHE PRAxis, 389 if; Schmid, Die Herrschaft
der Gesetze und deren raiiinlichen und zeitlichen, Grenzen (1863) 76.
" Story, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 376.
'Machado v. Fontes [1897] 2 Q. B. 23L
" Beale, What Law Governs the Validity o f a Contract (igog-io) 23 HAv. L.
REV. 79, 194.
"Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 339, note; Lorenzen, The Validity and
Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (1921) 30 YALE LAW JouRxAL,
565, 567.
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A very simple case will bring into evidence the inadequacy of Story's
maxims as a guide to the solution of the problems of the Conflict of
Laws. Suppose that the question relates to the validity of a deed to
land situated in state A, the deed being executed and delivered in state
B by X, a citizen of state C. According to Story's first maxim state A
has exclusive power over the property; state B has exclusive power over
the execution of the deed, the act being done in state B; and state C,
exclusive power over X. How are we to get out of the embarrassment?
By applying the law of state A where the property is situated? But
why should the laws of state B and of state C relinquish their power?
Who is to be the umpire to choose from among the competing powers
the one that is to control?
The only conclusion that can be reached from the foregoing discussion
is that the rules of the Conflict of Laws are not based upon, nor are they
derivable from, any uniform theory of territoriality.28 In one class of
cases reference is had to the law of the situs of the property; in others
to the law of the place where the act in question occurred. In still other
cases the rights are determined neither with reference to the situs of the
property, nor with reference to the law of the state where the act
occurred, but with reference to the law of domicile. Whether the rule
of the one state or of the other shall be chosen is not prescribed by any
supra-state authority, nor can it be deduced from any a priori principle.
In view of the foregoing it is a little surprising to find among the
American courts and writers of to-day a tendency to accept the doctrine
of the territoriality of law as the major premise for the solution of the
problems of the Conflict of Laws. How else can be explained state-
ments like the following:
"If the law of the place where the parties act refuses legal validity to
their acts, it is impossible to see on what principle some other law may
nevertheless give their acts validity. The law of the place of perform-
ance can have no effect as law in another place, namely, the place
where the parties act; for it is a fundamental doctrine of our law that
'the laws of every state affect and bind directly . .. . all contracts made,
and acts done within it. A state may therefore regulate . . . . the
validity of contracts and other acts done within it; the resulting rights
and duties growing out of these contracts and acts.' Any attempt to
make the law of the place of performance govern the act of contracting
is an attempt to give to that law extraterritorial effect.
'29
"In all these cases the matter must, it seems, be determined theoreti-
cally by the law governing the transaction, i. e., the law of the place
where the parties act in making their agreement. If by that law their
acts have no legal efficacy, then no other state can give them greater
This becomes all the more apparent if we compare the conclusions of the
different territorialists. See for example, Wdchter, Uber die Kollision der
Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten (1841) 24 ARcHIv irUR DIE CIVlISTISCHE
PRAXIS, 230; (1842) 25 ARcxriv FOR DIE CiV1LISTiSCHE PRAxIs, 151, 361; Schmid,
op. cit. supra note 25; Vareilles-Sommi&res, La S3vnthse du Droit International
Priv6 (1897).
' Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, supra note 26, at p. 267..
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effect. If by the law of that state their acts created a binding obliga-
tion upon the parties, then the parties who have acted under that law
must be bound by it."' 0
"'The question whether a contract is valid, that is, whether to the
agreement of the parties the law has annexed an obligation to perform
its terms, can on general principles be determined by no other law than
that which applies to the acts, that is, by the law of the place of con-
tracting. If the law at that place annexes an obligation to the acts of
the parties, the promisee has a legal right which no other law has power
to take away except as a result of new acts which change it. If on the
other hand the law of the place where the agreement is made annexes
no legal obligation to it, there is no other law which has 'power to
do so .. '
"This doctrine gives full scope to the territoriality of law, and enables
each sovereign to regulate acts of agreement done in his own territory."'"
As has been shown above, the exclusive power to determine the legal
consequences of operative facts can be assigned to a particular state only
by some supra-state authority; it does not follow from the nature of
sovereignty nor from any self-evident theory of territoriality. So far
as the rule of the place where the contract is made (state B) is deemed
to determine the validity of such contract it must necessarily be, in the
absence of any supra-state authority imposing such rule, because the
state in which the question arises (state A) has seen fit t6 select the rule
of such state.
However disappointing the foregoing conclusion may be to those who
believe that there ought to be as far as possible one body of rules govern--
Ibid. 268.
'Ibid. 27o-27i; see also Minor, Conflict of Laws (9o) 410. Mr. Justice
Holmes said in Slater v. Mexican National R. R. (1904) 194 U. S. 120, 126, 24
Sup. Ct. 58i, 582, 583:
"As Texas has statutes which give an action for wrongfully causing death, of
course there is no general objection of policy to enforcing such a liability there,
although it arose in another jurisdiction. Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., I68
U. S. 445. But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the
place of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree
is subject to the lex fori, with regard to either its quality or its consequences. On
the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is
operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that although
the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise
to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and
may be enforced wherever the person may be found. Stout v. Wood, i Blackf.(Ind.) 7z; Dennick v. Railroad Co., 'io3 U. S, II, 18. But as the only source of
this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that that law determines
not merely the existence of the obligation, Smith v. Condry, i How. 28, but equally
determines its extent. It seems to us unjust to allow a plaintiff to come here
absolutely depending on the foreign law for the foundation of his case, and yet
to deny the defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that law
would impose."
Compare with the above statement by Mr. Justice Holmes the following from
Judge Learned Hand in Guinness v. Miller (1923, S. D. N. Y.) 29i Fed. 769, 770:
"However, no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign, and,
when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can
only invoke an obligation recognized by that sovereign. A foreign sovereign under
civilized law imposes an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible
to that arising in the place where the tort occurs."
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ing the problems of the Conflict of Laws in all countries, or to those
who believe that the domestic rules should be the expression of "funda-
mental principles," nothing can be gained by hiding the truth and
making it appear that certain rules govern in the nature of things.
Such rules have not been discovered by the theoretical writers of the
greatest eminence, nor has a consistent set of rules been worked out as
yet by either the English or the American courts. The common law has
not hidden in its bosom a logical set of rules which can be derived from
its notion of territoriality. Sound progress in this field of the law,
as in all other departments of knowledge, can be made only if the actual
facts be faced, which show that the adoption of the one rule or the other
depends entirely upon considerations of policy which each sovereign
state must determine for itself.
Should the contention be made that the passages quoted above are
not a deduction from an a prior-i principle, but merely the expression of
what the common law courts have held on the subject, the answer must
be that such contention does not rest upon fact. The English courts
have not held that the validity of a contract shall be governed exclu-
sively by the law of the place of contracting, nor have the American
courts. It may be said without exaggeration that there is not a single
state in this country which has uniformly and consistently subscribed to
this doctrine. In the majority of the states it is rejected either in its
entirety or it has received support only in particular instances or direc-
tions. Under the prevailing conditions the law of the place of con-
tracting may be the better rule, or it may not be. The question is
subject to argument, and the answer should not be foreclosed by any
fictitious assumption regarding the existence of fixed general rules in
the "common law."
What has been stated in the preceding paragraph applies to most
questions in the Conflict of Laws. There are, relatively speaking, few
rules of the Conflict of Laws which can be said to be recognized by all
Anglo-American states, or by the great majority of them. To the
extent that there is such agreement, we may speak of them as common
rules; but to assert that there are general rules of the "common law,"
to be derived from its notion of territoriality, which have binding force
regarding matters concerning which there is little or no authority, or
as to which the decisions are in total disagreement, is to assert some-
thing that is untrue, for it presents a's existing and binding law some-
thing which has for its support merely the personal opinion of the
person making such assertion as to what he believes would constitute
a sound rule, and so far as such conclusion rests upon a general theory
concerning the nature of law rather than a careful weighing of the
conflicting interests and policies involved, it constitutes reasoning from
a fictitious major premise.
The charge to be made against this mode of dealing with the problems
of the Conflict of Laws is the same as that made by Dicey concerning
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the theoretical method in general, namely, "that it leads the writers who
adopt it to treat as being law what they tliink ought to be law." That
the a priori method has not yielded sound and satisfactory results,
.although it has been employed by the most eminent jurists on the conti-
nent for many years, is admitted by a very distinguished writer, who
says :32
"These imperfections (in the subject of the Conflict of Laws) do
not result solely from the special character and complexity of the
questions which Private International Law has for its object to resolve,
but also from the defective method which has been used in its elabora-
tion. The authors which have formulated its rules have almost always
attempted to deduce them from a very general and very abstract notion:
territorial sovereignty, personal sovereignty, community of law between
states, international courtesy, or, what amounts to the same thing, mutual
respect of one sovereign for another, maintenance of rights vested
underi the law of a foreign state, etc. The a priori principle, from
which these authors have pretended to derive their theory, has always
proved powerless to furnish or to justify a practical rule; on the
contrary it has only too often misled such author in his search for a
solution."
The notion that the rules of the Conflict of Laws can be derived
from some general formula or theory is responsible for another doctrine
-that of "public policy"-which in turn has caused the utmost confu-
sion. Realizing that the logical deductions from their a priori theory
could not be justified in all cases, the theoretical writers have allowed
the' ordinary rules, which govern "on principle," to be set aside under
certain circumstances by the rules of "public policy" or "public order."
Anglo-American courts and writers, as we have seen, 33 also use language
implying that the ordinary rules, governing "on principle," are the
expression of the territoriality of law, as understood by Anglo-Ameri-
can countries. These also are allowed to be nullified on grounds of
"'public policy" by certain provisions of the law of the state in which the
question arises. The foreign writers have tried their utmost to classify
these provisions, and to clarify the doctrine of public policy, but without
success.3 4  The term is used in different senses according to the general
point of view of the school to which the particular writer belongs or of
the individual writer himself. Some use it in a comprehensive sense,
Arminjon, Le Domaine du Droit Internatiowl Privi (i9g ) 49 Clunet, 905.
Supra notes 29-31.
""No attempt to define the limits of that reservation (public policy) has ever
succeeded, even to the extent of making its nature clearer than by saying that it
exists in favor of any stringent domestic policy, and that it is for the law of each
country, whether speaking by the mouth of its Legislature or by that of its judges,
to determine what parts of its policy are stringent enough to require its being
invoked." Westlake, Private Internatiomal Law (6th ed. 1922) 5i. For the
literature on the subject see Beale, Conflict of Laws (i916) 77, 78, note; also
Fink, Die Prinzipien des Intertatioitalen Privatrechts lind die Vorbehaltsklausel
(1914) 24 ZEITSCuRrFT FiR INTERNATIONALES REcHT, 138; Kosters, Public Policy
in Private International Law (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 745.
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so as to include what others regard as a special doctrine, namely, that
of the evasion of law, or fraud upon the law. 35  Most frequently the
doctrine of public policy is regarded as having merely a negative func-
tion, that of justifying the non-application of a "foreign" law, which
ought to govern "on principle." Others assign to it also a positive
function, according to which duties may be imposed contrary to those
that would result from the application of the. general rule. In this view,
which is at times shared by the courts, 38 the doctrine of public policy is
not merely a convenient safety-valve to prevent the application of
"foreign" law, but a method whereby old rules are modified and new
rules established. In England and the United States the doctrine of
public policy is generally limited to its negative function, and no attempt
has been made by the Anglo-American writers to reduce the cases
falling within this doctrine to any system or order.
The doctrine of public policy in the Conflict of Laws ought to have
been a warning that there was something the matter with the reasoning
upon which the rules to which it is the exception were supposed to be
based. Judge Beach has called attention to the illogical character of
this doctrine as between the different states of this country3 7 and a
similar charge may be made with respect to the application of this
doctrine to foreign countries. If some power other than that of state
A prescribes for A the rule that is to govern "on principle," if that
rule is obligatory upon state A, how can state A deny effect to such, rule
in a particular case? If state A is bound to recognize the exclusive
power of state B to attach legal consequences to certain operative facts,
how can the courts of state A nullify the effect given to such operative
facts by state B? If state B had the power to create "vested rights, 3
so far as state A is concerned, why should such rights not be entitled
to recognition if called in question in state A? Is it not strange to
argue in the first place that state A has no choice in accepting the origi-
nal rule and then to admit that it has the power to set aside the effect of
that rule whenever it pleases on the plea that such recognition or
enforcement would violate its public policy?
This situation has resulted from the fact that it has been deemed
necessary to discover general principles which could claim binding
authority. Only in this way was it possible to find on the continent a
body of rules entitled to claim universal recognition, an aim which most
" To 'the effect that the doctrines should be kept apart, see Arminj on, La Fraude
a la Loi en Droit International Privi (192o) 47 Clunet, 409; (1921) 48 Clunet,
62, 419.
"France, Cass. July 22, 19o3 (31 Clunet, 355); March 27, 1922 (49 Clunet,
115); App. Douai, March 26, 1902 (3o Clunet, 599); Italy, Trib. Civ. Livorno,
May 5, 1894 (25 Clunet, 415).
'Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (i918) 27 YAL'E
LAW Jo RNAL, 656.
,s Professor Beale asserts that the common law courts have worked out indige-
nously a theory of vested rights. Beale, Conflict of Laws (1916) 105.
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theoretical writers have had before their eyes. In this country the
finding of such general principles must have seemed indispensable, from
the standpoint of the writers adopting the a priori mode of reasoning, to
prevent confusion in this branch of the law, as might result, it was
feared, if each state felt free, within constitutional limitations, to adopt
the rules of the Conflict of Laws which its own sense of convenience,
justice and policy might suggest. Only in -this way can be explained
the view that there is a set of fully developed common law principles
which are binding upon the courts of the individual states.
The correct mode of approach to this subject would strip it of all
fictions and deal with all phenomena a posterior.39 Thus viewed we
find that each sovereign state can determine the rules of the Conflict of
Laws in accordance with its own notions of what is just and proper,
and so far as the individual states of this country are not bound hy some
constitutional provision, they have the same power.4" From the stand-
point of the Conflict of Laws all states are primarily interested in the
proper administration of justice. Under modern conditions such an
administration of justice often demands that a state shall take into con-
sideration the rules of other states. Whether it will do so in a particu-
lar situation or not will depend upon the conclusion it reaches as to
what is right and proper. In dealing with cases involving foreign
elements the court will take into consideration the needs of international
trade and the requirements of an increasing intercourse between states
and nations. In certain cases, where the operative facts connect the
case with some foreign state or country, it will conclude that the promo-
tion of the above ends requires the application of "foreign" law. In
other cases, in which the "foreign" law is so far opposed to the local
law as to shock the conscience of the court, it will determine the case
with reference to the local rule. As justice can bd administered only
in accordance with the sense of what is right existing in the community
in which the court sits, the feelings of the local community cannot be
disregarded altogether. The general problem is, therefore, always the
same: What are the demands of justice in the particular situation;
what is the controlling policy?
If the situation is one admitting of the application of "foreign" law,
the choice of the rule to be applied will be determined again in many
instances by general social or economic considerations. For example,
if the question relates to capacity, a state may conclude that the principal
interest involved is the protection of its citizens or of persons domiciled
within its territory, wherever they may be. If this be so, it will probably
say that the lex patriae or the lex domicilii governs "capacity." On the
other hand, it may conclude that its principal interest in the matter is the
' See Fink, Die P1rinzipien des Internationalen Privalrechts und die Vorbehalts-
klausel, supra note 34, at p. 164.
"International law imposes practically no restraint. See Lorenzen, The Theory
of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, supra note 17, at p. 265, 278 ff.
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security of local transactions. In this event it will say that the lex loci
contractus governs capacity. Continental countries, however, have
sometimes chosen both points of contact in this case. 41 According to
these the lex patriae governs capacity, but a person under disability
according to his personal law, but not according to the lex fori, will not
be allowed to set it up against the party contracting with him in the
state of the forum.
A similar mode or reasoning would apply if the question related to
the validity of a foreign marriage. In this country the courts have
come to the conclusion that the place where the marriage is celebrated is
the point of contact in which each state is particularly interested, and by
way of reciprocity they have deemed it best to apply the same point of
view with respect to marriages celebrated abroad. 42 The English and
continental courts, 43 on the other hand, have reached a different con-
clusion with respect to "capacity," as to which they have preferred the
personal law of the parties (leax domicilii or lex patriae). Some late
English decisions have insisted upon two points of contact with respect
to marriages by foreigners in England (the lex domicilii and the lex
loci celebrationis).4
Whatever the point or points of contact chosen by the lex fori, special
situations may require the-application of the local rule. Suppose, for
example, that two citizens of the forum go into another state for the
purpose of contracting a marriage which they could not enter into under
the local law of the forum. In such a case the courts might reach the
conclusion that the local interests of the state demand that its law
should not be allowed to be evaded by its own citizens and that its local
rule should therefore prevail. 45 In the customary phraseology, it would
be said that the general rule would not be enforced on grounds of public
policy.
Suppose, again, that a Mohammedan having two wives should attempt
to cohabit with both within the limits of the forum. In this case, there
would be no doubt that the local rule should have precedence. On the
other hand, if a child, born of the second marriage in a country where
polygamy is recognized, should claim by descent title to real property
situated within the forum, the courts would no doubt recognize that
claim. Intermediate situations between the illustrations given might
give rise to considerable doubt as to whether in view of the local interests
involved tlie marriage should be regarded as null and void. According
"See for example Art. 7, Introductory Law, German Civil Code.
"See Commonwealth v. Lane (1873) 113 Mass. 458.
'Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 627, note.
" Chetti v. Chetti [19o9] P. 67; Ex parte M.ir-Anwaruddin [i9i7, C. A.] i K. B.
634; see Dicey, op. cit. supra note i, at p. 839.
"In re Stull's Estate (1898) 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16; Pennegar v. State (1889)
87 Tenn. 244. 10 S. W. 305; Wilson v. Cook (1912) 256 Ill. 46o, ioo N. E. 222.
Contra: Van Voorhis v. Brintnall (1881) 86 N. Y. 18; State v. Shattuck (1897)
69 Vt. 403, 38 AtI. 81; Dudley v. Dudley (1911) 151 Iowa, 142, 13o N. W. 785.
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to the traditional view it is customary to say that a polygamous marriage
will not be recognized on grounds of public policy. Such a statement,
however, is inaccurate, for a judge cannot close his eyes to the institution
of polygamy in all cases, and it is only when it reaches a certain point
of contact with the law of the forum that it can be said to come into real
conflict with its social policy. Only in these cases will the judge be
justified to regard it as of no effect.46
Anglo-American courts, it is subraitted, have developed the rules of
the Conflict of Laws in the main, though not always consciously, in
the manner just outlined. Their aim has been to render a just decision
under the circumstances of the particular case and they have reached
their conclusions so far as possible by a consideration of the social
interests involved. Many rules of the Conflict of Laws, it is true,
have been followed without a reconsideration of the matter, because
they were established elsewhere and appeared reasonable. The courts
whose decisions were followed, having reached their conclusion in the
manner above described and the local conditions being similar, there
was no need of doing the work over again.
In many situations in the Conflict of Laws, where there are no
social or economic considerations of a decisive character, the task of
choosing the proper rule becomes extremely difficult. Whether the local
rule shall be applied in these cases or some "foreign" rule will have
to be determined as best it may in the light of analogy and the expe-
rience and practice of other states or nations. In these instances, it
matters less what the rule is than that it shall be certain and so far as
possible uniform.
So far. as the Supreme Court of the United States is empowered to
lay down compulsory rules of the Conflict of Laws for the courts of
the different states under the "Full Faith and Credit" clause, the
"Due Process" clause, etc., of the federal constitution, the individual
states are not free to act as they please. The rules are imposed upon
them, and in the nature of things the rules are dictated by what the
Supreme Court conceives to be the general interest. The particular
interests and policies of the different states are submerged in these
cases in the general interest of the nation. But so far as the states are
free to choose the Conflict of Laws rules they have the power of
independent sovereigns who can, and do, determine their rules with
reference to their own view of what justice demands.
The method above outlined, which, subject to the constitutional
limitations referred to, gives to each state the power to assert in each
problem of the Conflict of Laws its own views, seems at first sight less
attractive than the method which seeks to derive the rules of the Con-
flict of Laws from some supra-state authority, be it that of international
law, or, so far as the courts of this country and of England are con-
' See COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 471.
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cerned, that of a "common law" which is binding upon all. It seems to
suggest the absence of general rules and to necessitate the commitment
of each case to the caprice of the particular judge before whom it may
come. A closer study of the problem shows, however, that these fears
are unfounded. So far as this country is concerned, it must be remem-
bered that the Anglo-American legal tradition, which directs and
controls our legal mode of reasoning, will in the very nature of things
prevent our judges from acting in an arbitrary manner within the
field of the Conflict of Laws. They will be guided by the experience
of other common law states and will depart from their conclusions only
if there are substantial reasons for so doing.
No doubt it would be better if there existed a supra-state authority
with power to prescribe the rules of the Conflict of Laws. Each state
would sacrifice in such event more of its local policies than it is dis-
posed to do to-day, but as an equivalent for such sacrifice it would
gain the advantages resulting from greater harmony in the admin-
istration of international justice.
By accepting some a priori theory for the solution of the Conflict
of Laws, a state is obliged to make a similar sacrifice of its local policies
without gaining a corresponding benefit from greater international
uniformity, for all a priori views, whether based upon some theory
concerning the binding nature of international law or upon some theory
concerning the territoriality of law, express only the theory which the
particular writer has in mind. There are thus as many theories as
there are writers and consequently as much contrariety in the results
as before. Notwithstanding the vogue that a priori theories have
enjoyed during the last century on the continent, no approach toward
uniformity has been attained. There is no reason, therefore, why our
courts should give up their traditional way of working out the problems
of the Conflict of Laws in favor of any a priori theory which has no
support other than that of the person advocating the same.
